With President-elect Masoud Pezeshkian set to formally assume power at the end of July, his present focus is on interacting with stakeholders, outlining his policies, and selecting his team amid indications that his way ahead may be somewhat eased by realignments in the conservative/hardline camp.
Pezeshkian was due to be sworn in next month, but the date was subsequently advanced to July 30. Two days before that, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei will officially ratify his victory.
In the interim period, the President-elect is engaged in meeting various sections of the establishment, including senior clerics, top defence officials, including the IRGC, whose influence extends into foreign policy too, and others.
Meanwhile, Pezeshkian revealed his views on the foreign aims of his presidency, in a signed article titled 'My message to the new world' carried in various dailies on July 12. While the immediate priority was "strengthening relations with our neighbours," spanning Turkey to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf monarchies, he also mentioned his intention to strengthen ties with China and Russia, which "have consistently stood by us during challenging times."
He also stressed "fostering mutually beneficial relations with emerging international players in the Global South, especially with African nations" and deepening relations with Latin American countries.
Pezeshkian followed this with telephonic talks with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, Uzbekistan President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, and Qatar's Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, as per reports on Thursday.
On the other hand, work on selecting the new ministers began soon after Pezeshkian's victory over his hardline rival Saeed Jalili in the run-off on July 5, with former Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, who had campaigned extensively for Pezeshkian, said to be overseeing the process.
Political analyst Mostafa Najafi, in a post on X, listed some of the incoming President's guidelines, including over half of the new ministers being below 50 years and women comprising at least one-fifth of the total. Also, less than half should be previous ministers.
Pezeshkian's office had issued 18 criteria for new ministers, including "belief in expert work", and "avoiding ethnic, religious, and regional factional tendencies."
Women ministers, if appointed and confirmed, will be a vital achievement for Pezeshkian, given that there has been just one since the Islamic Revolution - Marzieh Vahid-Dastjerdi, who served as Health and Medical Education Minister in populist President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's second government (2009-13). However, Ahmadinejad's other candidates Sousan Keshavarz (Education) and Fatemeh Ajorlou (Welfare and Social Security) failed to secure parliamentary approval.
Despite Zarif's contribution, he is unlikely to return as Foreign Minister - the post he held in the Hasan Rouhani government - as his appointment is unlikely to pass muster in the conservative/hardliner-dominated Majles.
While the name of Ali Akbar Salehi, who served as Foreign Minister in the second Ahmadinejad government after the sudden sacking of Manouchehr Mottaki, was doing the rounds, former Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi, the chief nuclear negotiator in the talks that led to the 2015 deal, is tipped for the job, as per both conservative and reformist media reports.
Another key appointment will be of the Interior Minister - given Pezeshkian's assurances on loosening social curbs - and former IRGC officer and lawmaker Elias Hazrati, conservative cleric and former Intelligence Minister Mahmoud Alavi, and former reformist lawmaker and politician Majid Ansari are said to be in the running.
The name of conservative Presidential candidate Mostafa Pourmohammadi, who created ripples during the run-up to the elections for championing better diplomatic relations, more social freedoms, and opposition to Internet bans, is also said to be under consideration.
Pourmohammadi, a former Justice Minister under Rouhani, is also said to be in the running for the vital post of Intelligence Minister - a post confined to clerics as its holders must be mujtahids (qualified to independently interpret the Sharia).
On the other hand, all is not well in the conservative/hardliner camp as supporters of Jalili and Majles Speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, who finished third in the first round, trading blame for dividing the vote.
This was bolstered by confirmations of rumours that Esmail Qa'ani, who commands the IRGC's Quds Force - which set up and supports the 'Axis of Resistance' in the region - had held a meeting with Jalili and Qalibaf ahead of the elections and tried to persuade the former to withdraw in favour of Qalibaf.
While Pezeshkian met both Jalili and Qalibaf after his victory, it was the second meeting that was more important, since it is the latter who can help or hinder his programme in the Majles, where traditional conservatives outnumber hardliners. As there is no history of bad blood between Qalibaf and Pezeshkian, they could strike a modus vivendi to avoid friction between the executive and legislative branches.
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